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RECENT DECISIONS

TRUST MORTGAGES - EFFECT OF FORECLOSURE OF SUBSEQUENT MORTGAGE AS PRIOR LmN UNDER SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT OF WHICH BONDHOLDERS HAD No KNOWLEDGE - Plaintiff held bonds secured by a trust mortgage. The trustee, Moore, without the consent of all the bondholders, had agreed
to subordinate the trust mortgage to a subsequent mortgage. Defendant, the
assignee of the subsequent mortgagee, foreclosed its mortgage as a prior lien.
Moore was properly served but did not appear, as no bondholder agreed to pay
the costs of the litigation. In the present suit to invalidate the subordinating
agreement and reinstate the trust mortgage as the prior lien, held, the judgment
in the foreclosure action determined the issue of priority and was conclusive
against all the bondholders. King v. Franmor Equity Corp., 260 App. Div. 303,
20 N. Y. S. (2d) 909 (1940).

In the instant case, the bondholder based his assertion of the invalidity of
the subordinating decree on several factors. The trustee made the agreement without the bondholder's consent. Since a trustee has no right to subordinate his
lien voluntarily to that of a subsequent mortgagee, any agreement placing the
trust mortgage in an inferior position without the beneficiary's consent is not
binding on him.1 Also, the making of the agreement and permitting the fore-

1

JoNEs, CoRPoRATE BoNDS AND MoRTGAGEs, 3d ed.,

§ 291 at p. 323 (1907):

"A trustee for mortgage bondholders who in violation of the trust consents that receivers' certificates shall be given a preference lien over the mortgage bonds does not
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closure judgment by default were not only without the bondholder's consent,
but were without his knowledge; and it is extremely inequitable to deprive a
man of his property rights without giving him an opportunity to appear and
state his claim.2 Furthermore, the subsequent mortgagee knew the prior mortgage was a trust mortgage, and yet made no attempt to determine whether all
the real parties in interest had agreed to the subordination and the foreclosure.
In fact, not all of the bondholders were made parties defendant in the foreclosure action. Lastly, plaintiff's interest was solely secured by the prior mortgage and the action removed all that security.3 On the other hand, several basic
policies of the law support the defendant. Today's business world is making
increasing use of the trust mortgage arrangement, and to force anyone dealing
with such a mortgage to contact the possible thousands of bondholders directly
would render the arrangement useless and thereby remove a practical and
beneficial financing device from the business repertoire.4 Also, the indenture
gave the trustee the power to represent the bondholders in all actions in defense
of a suit affecting the security of the bonds or the property covered by the liens; 5
therefore, the decree permitting the defendant to foreclose should bar the bondholders whether Moore appeared or whether he took judgment against the trust
by default.6 The bondholders had constructive, if not actual, knowledge of this
thereby bind the bondholders or estop them to object to the validity of such certificates." Belknap Savings Bank v. Lamar Land & Canal Co., 28 Colo. 326, 64 P. 212
(1901).
2
We do not enter into the constitutional argument here, but merely suggest this
is going to make an innocent party's position equitably stronger than another innocent
party's. A trustee had a large amount of control over the trust, but the court suggested,
"cases may arise in which it would be proper to have before the court the beneficiaries
themselves, or some one other than the trustee to represent their interests." Kerrison
v. Stewart, 93 U. S. 155 at 160 (1876).
3
In Beals v. Illinois, M. & T. R.R., 133 U.S. 290, 10 S. Ct. 314 (1890), the
bondholders found that their bonds were cancelled and annulled though they may not
have known of the suit.
4
McElrath v. Pittsburgh & Steubenville R. R., 68 Pa. St. 37 at 40-41 (1871):
"It would be impossible, and if possible, excessively inconvenient, to make all parties
holding the bonds, which are separate instruments, parties to the decree of foreclosure
and sale under the mortgage. . •. the trustee is the party to be summoned to defend
the interest of those who claim under the mortgage."
5
McCLELLAND and F1sHER, THE LAw OF CoRPORATE MoRTGAGEl BOND IssuEs
774 (1937), has a good example of the provisions relating to a trustee's power. In
the principal case the power of attorney was evidently definitely placed in the indenture and not merely implied from the position as trustee. Kerrison v. Stewart, 93 U.S.
155 at 160 (1876), states, "[the trustee] may be invested with such powers and subjected to such obligations that those for whom he holds will be bound by what is done
against him, as well as by what is done by him."
6
Although a guardian was not properly qualified, his actions passed good title.
In re Cole's Will, 254 App. Div. 199, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 312 (1938). See also Shaw
v. Railroad, 100 U. S. 605 at 6II (1879), stating: "The trustee of a railroad mortgage represents the bondholders in all legal proceedings carried on by him affecting
his trust, to which they are not actual parties, and whatever binds him, if he acts in
good faitli, binds them."
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power of attorney granted the trustee and were bound by his actions. Each had
an opportunity to investigate and enforce his rights under the trust agreement. 7
If the trustee was fraudulent or negligent in his conduct so as to cause the bondholders any loss, they could look to the trustee for reimbursement and not to an
innocent third party who had made the usual contract directly with the trustee. 8
The law itself sets up a protective hedge of requirements around the bondholders
as far as foreclosure actions are concerned. Defendant properly met each requirement in his suit. To determine priority .finally in a foreclosure action, the defendant, whose mortgage is prior in time, must not only be brought in as a party
who is claiming a priority over the subsequent lienor plainti:ff,9 but the pleadings
must de.finitely indicate that the defendant is being considered as a subsequent
lienor and that his rights are to be determined in the action. 10 In the Equity
Corporation's action to foreclose its mortgage, it carefully alleged the making
of the subordination agreement, and that the trust mortgage was therefore subordinate to its mortgage, and asked that the trust mortgage be barred and foreclosed of all right, title, claim and equity of redemption in the mortgaged
premises.11 Courts have seldom had to determine whether a bondholder-bene7
Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Vanderbilt Realty Improvement Co., 155
App. Div. 723, 140 N. Y. S. 1008 (1913); Seibert v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry.,
52 Minn. 148, 53 N. W. I 134 (1893), suggests that bondholders can bring an action
themselves to enforce the security for the common benefit if the trustee neglects to do
so. While not this type of case, the court held that the bondholders "could have ascertained all the facts upon inquiry; nothing was hidden or concealed" in Benton v. Safe
Deposit Bank, 255 N. Y. 260 at 267, 174 N. E. 648 (1931).
8
Trustees under this type of arrangement do not have the same duties and liabilities as an ordinary trustee but they still have some responsibility. 2 JoNES, BoNDS
AND BoND SECURITIES, 4th ed., § 1053 at p. 493 (1935): "The general duty to act in
good faith for the best interest of all the bondholders is laid upon all trustees.
This has been expressed to be a duty to exercise the diligence and care which would
naturally be expected of an intelligent person acting in like circumstances to protect his
own mortgage." Id., § 1060: "A trustee can not, without incurring the penalities of an
action for damages, do anything which will cause loss to the bondholders whom it
represents..•."
9
The defendant must be clearly brought in the suit by the complaint. If summoned with notice that "No personal claim is made against you," the foreclosure is
not binding. Jasper v. Rozinski, 228 N. Y. 349 at 353, 127 N. E. 189 (1920).
10
Not only must defendant be made an adverse party, but the question of priority
must be plainly raised. A wife was made party to a foreclosure action but her rights to
dower were not questioned. The court found that those rights were not affected by the
judgment as they had not been raised, and they could not be adjudicated there as it
was a right adverse to the mortgagor. "But her inchoate right of dower was not in
issue, and there could be no valid adjudication adverse to it." Merchants' Bank v.
Thomson, 55 N. Y. 7 at II (1873). Tax Lien Co. of New York v. Schultze, 213
N. Y. 9, 106 N. E. 751 (1914); Jasper v. Rozinski, 228 N. Y. 349, 127 N. E.
189 (1920).
11
A complaint stating the defendant was a "subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer
or otherwise" with the usual plea for foreclosure was not sufficient to bar the defendant
when his rights were actually superior in Tax Lien Co. of New York v. Schultze, 213
N. Y. 9 at 14, 106 N. E. 751 (1914). In Jasper v. Rozinski, 228 N. Y. 349 at 353,
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ficiary of a trust mortgage loses his right to a prior lien by the failure of his
trustee to appear as a defendant in an ordinary foreclosure action.12 Without
discussing the question of the trustee's probable liability to the bondholders,13
it is submitted that the court wisely declined to reopen the question of priority.14

Rex B. Martin

127 N. E. 189 (1920), the defendants were alleged to "have or claim to have some
interest in or lien upon said mortgaged premises or on some part thereof, which interest
or lien, if any, has accrued subsequently to the lien of the said mortgage or is subject
or subordinate thereto." But the summons stated that no personal claim was being made
and the court held that the foreclosure did not bar the defendant.
12 Most cases on this question have different elements going to notice, estoppel or
improper pleading. One case was exactly in point and there the court held as the New
York court did. Board of Supervisors of Iowa County v. Mineral Point R. R., 24 \Vis.
93 at 128 (1869), stating: "The holders of the bonds were not, therefore, necessary
parties; and the proceedings and decree, without them, are as valid as if they had been
brought in." Other ways of gaining priority for a subsequent mortgage have been
suggested by various law reviews. Junior lienors plead the statute of limitations against
the senior interest holders and thus receive prior claims. See 27 CAL. L. REv. 66
(1938), and 32 ILL. L. REV. 750 (1938). Some states permit junior mortgagees to
plead usury in the prior mortgage contract and thus limit the prior mortgagee's righ1
to principal plus legal interest. 24 MINN. L. REv. 124 (1939). 48 YALE L. J. 683
(193.9) provides an excellent discussion of the problem of subrogation whereby the
purchaser of the rights of a senior mortgagee may or may not discover the junior
mortgagee has succeeded to the place of priority.
13 Supra, note 8. Would an intelligent person subordinate his own mortgage withou1
apparent fair consideration and then fail to appear when the subsequent mortgagee
sued to foreclose?
u New York's position on the rules of res judicata is stated in Matter of Laudy's
Will, 161 N. Y. 429, 55 N. E. 914 (1900), and in Goebel v. Hila, 111 N. Y. 170,
18 N. E. 649 (1888).

